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Fair trial rights in the UK post Brexit: out with the Charter and EU law, in with the 
ECHR? 
  
Following the historic June 23 decision of the UK people to exit the European Union, 
confusion abounds about the future of Britain in Europe. With a negotiation possibly still 
months away, both the UK and the ‘remaining’ 27 EU Member States have held their cards 
close to their chest, that is assuming they have a master plan for the labyrinthine negotiation 
that awaits them. A June 24 New York Times op-ed spoke of ‘Britain’s Brexit leap in the 
dark’.1 Four months on this pessimistic analysis does not seem at all far from the truth,2 with 
Theresa May going so far as to suggest in Parliament that the UK has not decided yet how to 
proceed with Brexit: 
 
It is about developing our own British model. So we will not take decisions until we 
are ready. We will not reveal our hand prematurely. And we will not provide a 
running commentary.3 
 
As we are moving forward in these unchartered waters, in an environment of disorientation 
and ‘political poker’, we find ourselves left with little more than an ability for speculation. 
On the common market, immigration, agriculture, business and education, to take a few stark 
illustrations, all is really to play for in deciding the UK’s future relationship with Europe. The 
outcome of the negotiations can theoretically range from the extreme of quasi-EU member 
status to burning bridges with Europe, even if it is intuitive to predict that the UK and the EU 
will in the end settle for the middle ground.  
In the area of criminal justice and human rights, however, we already have a solid 
indication of ‘the day after’, as a result of having had glimpses of it in the recent past. This is 
because the Lisbon Treaty – in giving the UK the ability to opt in and out of EU criminal 
justice legislation – has in reality brought about a de facto Brexit. In relation to fair trial 
rights, more specifically, the UK has, for the most part, chosen to not opt in to key legislation  
introduced – in the form of EU Directives – in the aftermath of a 2009 Roadmap which set 
out a gradual approach towards establishing a full catalogue of procedural rights for suspects 
                                                 
1 R Cohen, ‘Britain’s Brexit leap in the dark’, The New York Times, 24 June 2016.  
2 P Papakonstantinou, ‘Uncertainty on both sides of the Channel’, Kathimerini, 28 August 2016 (in Greek). 
3 J Henley and P Walker, ‘Brexit weekly briefing: we’re going to be kept in the dark’, The Guardian, 13 
September 2016. 
across the EU.4 The Roadmap Directives built on fair trial rights laid down in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter). Now neither the Charter nor the 
Directives giving it effect will be relevant to the UK once it has formally exited the EU (with 
the exception of those Directives that will have already been transposed into national law, 
unless Parliament decides otherwise), and by definition the UK will no longer be part of this 
European integration process that has arguably triggered a fair trial rights ‘revolution’ in 
Europe.5  
 
(Missing out on) the fair trial rights revolution in Europe? 
 
Following on the Roadmap, the EU adopted far reaching Directives on the rights to 
interpretation and translation (2010), information (2012), and access to a lawyer in criminal 
proceedings (2013), taking a major first step in the direction of establishing common 
minimum standards for suspects and accused persons across the EU. These Directives, which 
signal ‘a fundamental shift in the focus of European criminal law, from a system privileging 
inter-state judicial and police cooperation to a system where the protection of the 
fundamental rights of the affected individuals should be fully ensured’,6 and which are 
already having a drastic effect in EU Member States,7 paved the way for a second generation 
of EU Directives on procedural rights. More specifically, on 15 December 2015 the Council 
and Parliament agreed a Directive on procedural safeguards for children suspected or accused 
in criminal proceedings. On 9 March 2016 the Council adopted a Directive that aims to 
strengthen certain aspects of the presumption of innocence, with an emphasis on the right to 
silence and the right against self-incrimination, and the right to be present at trial in criminal 
proceedings. Finally, days only after the June 23 referendum, the EU institutions took a major 
and final step forward in the Roadmap process, in agreeing the most controversial of the legal 
                                                 
4 The Roadmap stemmed from the European Council’s Stockholm Programme for ‘an open and secure Europe’, 
which placed special emphasis on the idea of ‘a Europe built on fundamental rights’ as one its basic tenets. 
Council of Europe, The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting the 
Citizens, 2 December 2009, 17024/09. 
5 See generally LEAP and Fair Trials, Defence Rights in Europe: The Road Ahead (2016). 
6 V Mitsilegas, ‘The Future of European Criminal Justice’, paper prepared for the Commission Expert Group on 
EU Criminal Law Policy, 12 March 2014. See also T Konstadinides and N O’Meara, ‘Fundamental Rights and 
Judicial Protection’ in D Acosta Arcarazo and CC Murphy (eds), EU Security and Justice Law: After Lisbon 
and Stockholm (Hart Publishing, 2014). 
7 See eg how the Directive on the right to access to a lawyer has been of paramount importance in leading the 
Dutch Supreme Court to recognise that, in addition to the right to consult a lawyer prior to interrogation, the 
suspect also has the fundamental right to have a lawyer present when interrogated by the police. D 
Giannoulopoulos and K Pitcher, ‘The Shifting Terrain for Suspects’ Rights in Europe – the Right to Legal 
Assistance Saga in the Netherlands’, Fair Trials Blog, 23 May 2016. 
texts that were planned as part of this highly ambitious project: the Directive on the right to 
legal aid, which aims to increase ‘mutual trust’ among EU states and ultimately enhance 
European cooperation in criminal cases.8 
Taking much of their inspiration from – and running parallel to – European Court of 
Human Rights jurisprudence that has had a cataclysmic effect in EU Member States, 
particularly those that had long resisted the idea of lawyers ‘entering the police station’, the 
Roadmap Directives underpin a fair trial rights revolution in Europe and an unprecedented 
coming together of EU Member States around a group of core pre-trial procedural rights.9 
But the UK has chosen to stay out of this process. It has transposed the first two – less 
controversial – Directives on the right to translation and interpretation and the right to 
information, but has confirmed that it will not opt in to any of the Directives that followed.  
The UK’s decision to not opt in to the Directive on the right to access to a lawyer in 
particular was perhaps the biggest oxymoron in this process of post Lisbon emerging 
isolationism in criminal justice matters; the UK had long led the way in Europe in legislating 
custodial interrogation rights and ensuring their effective implementation in practice.10 
Compared to the shock waves that the new emphasis on custodial interrogation rights sent 
down the spine of other EU Member States,11 the UK would have easily absorbed possible 
vibrations, simply by making adjustments to long standing legislation and practice. Yet the 
UK decided it should not partake in this process, taking everyone by surprise and signaling 
the shape of things to come.  
 
Brexit’s damaging effect 
 
Brexit can now exacerbate the increasingly ambiguous relationship with Europe on criminal 
justice matters. We must widen the angle of our vision to understand why. We must note, in 
                                                 
8 European Council – Council of the European Union, ‘Legal aid in criminal proceedings: Council and 
Parliament reach an agreement’; Fair Trials – Legal Experts Advisory Panel, Position paper on the proposed 
directive on provisional legal aid for suspects or accused persons deprived of liberty and legal aid in European 
arrest warrant proceedings, February 2015.  
9 See generally D Giannoulopoulos, ‘Strasbourg Jurisprudence, Law Reform and Comparative Law: A Tale of 
the Right to Custodial Legal Assistance in Five Countries’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 103-129. 
10 Giving evidence before the Select Committee on Extradition Law, Baroness Ludford said characteristically: ‘I 
am sorry the UK has not opted into the directive on the right to a lawyer, because I think we have the gold 
standard on that in the EU and it is a pity that we do not show leadership on that particular measure.’ Select 
Committee on Extradition Law, Second report, Extradition: UK law and practice (2015) para 343. 
11 See eg the response of Scotland and France in D Giannoulopoulos, ‘ “North of the Border and Across the 
Channel: Custodial Legal Assistance Reforms in Scotland and France’ [2013] Crim LR 369; D 
Giannoulopoulos, ‘Custodial Legal Assistance and Notification of the Right to Silence in France: Legal 
Cosmopolitanism and Local Resistance’ (2013) 24 Criminal Law Forum 291. 
particular, that while the UK has not transposed post Lisbon Directives recognising key 
procedural rights, it has, on the other hand, opted in to a significant number of EU Directives 
– and opted back into key third pillar measures – designed to enhance judicial and police 
cooperation and facilitate the fight against crime, most notably the European Arrest Warrant. 
However, as Mitsilegas has demonstrated, this ‘varied landscape’ with regards to UK 
participation in EU criminal law measures has been posing ‘significant challenges for legal 
certainty, coherence and the protection of fundamental rights’ even prior to Brexit, and will 
considerably reduce the scope for criminal justice cooperation with the EU in the post Brexit 
era.12 This is because the Roadmap Directives aimed to improve the balance between judicial 
and police cooperation measures that facilitate prosecution and those that protect procedural 
rights of the individual,13 with the aim, ultimately, to enhance mutual trust as the cornerstone 
of judicial cooperation in the EU.14 After Brexit, it will therefore be challenging for the UK 
to secure the former – even if it is through bilateral agreements with EU Member States – 
without subscribing to the latter.15 These two key areas of EU legislation in criminal law 
matters are now highly intertwined, and, once outside the opt in/opt out compromises 
previously allowed by the Lisbon Treaty, the UK will arguably no longer be able to cherry 
pick the instruments it prefers. Brexit will thus put the UK at a disadvantage on judicial and 
police cooperation in Europe. 
Equally importantly, it is suspected persons in this country that are likely to be worse off 
as a result of the UK no longer following the EU in this recent, but powerful, upward 
trajectory towards legislating suspects’ rights. Of course, we should be under no illusion that 
fair trial standards in EU Member States have improved overnight, as a result of the coming 
into effect of EU Directives. Nothing could be further from the truth.16 In addition, the 
common law’s strong grounding on the adversarial tradition provides sufficient reassurance 
that the UK will not be left behind in Europe in relation to protecting fair trial rights. But all 
this is not to say that the UK system is above reproach17 or that it does not stand corrected by 
                                                 
12 V Mitsilegas, ‘The Uneasy Relationship between the UK and European Criminal Law: From Opt-Outs to 
Brexit?’ [2016] Crim LR 517, 522. See also House of Lords, European Union Committee, ‘EU Police and 
Criminal Justice Measures: The UK’s 2014 Opt-Out Decision’, 13th Report of Session 2012-13, HL Paper 159. 
13 Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings, Recital 
10.  
14 Ibid., Recital 7. 
15 Mitsilegas (n 12) 534. 
16 See eg Ed Cape and J Hodgson, ‘The Right to Access to a Lawyer at Police Stations – Making the European 
Union Directive Work in Practice’ (2014) 5 New Journal of European Criminal Law 450. 
17 Empirical research on suspects’ rights has time again brought to light very significant gaps in UK legislation 
and practice in relation to the exercise of custodial interrogation rights. See eg V Kemp and J Hodgson, 
‘England and Wales: Empirical Findings’ in Vanderhallen et al. (ed), Interrogating Young Suspects: Procedural 
external (European) oversight, or that it has not already benefited from the joined up work of 
the EU Member States and the institutions of the EU for that matter, not least in the context 
of the recent Roadmap Directives.  
To take a few examples, the right to information Directive has led to the introduction in 
the UK of a revised ‘Letter of Rights’ and created a new obligation on police to provide 
sufficient information to the suspect prior to the interview as well as documents essential for 
challenging the lawfulness of arrest or detention when the suspect is booked in at the police 
station, at reviews or on charge. In other words, it filled an important gap in existing 
legislation. Opting in to the Directive on the right of access to a lawyer would have similarly 
put pressure on Parliament to widen the scope of the right to legal assistance, by extending its 
application to investigative and evidence gathering acts other than the questioning of the 
suspect, thus providing more substantial protections to suspects.18 Following the same line of 
reasoning, the new Directive on the presumption of innocence would have most likely 
necessitated reopening the discussion about the courts’ power to draw adverse inferences 
from silence,19 a taboo of UK criminal justice that one hardly comes across in other parts of 
the world – including in the common law world – but that has mysteriously been taken as 
something of a given in the English Law of Evidence and criminal procedure.20 It also hardly 
needs emphasising that, in view of the controversial cuts imposed by UK governments on 
legal aid in recent years,21 the forthcoming Legal Aid Directive would have provided a useful 
external point of reference to the relevant debate. 
It must be stressed that by opting out of legislation that concerns fair trial rights, the UK 
has not just turned its back on Europe, it has also turned its back on its own history of 
noteworthy advances in this area; advances that have had a marked influence in Europe. With 
Brexit looming, it is therefore now reasonable to predict that the UK’s ability to positively 
                                                                                                                                                       
Safeguards from an Empirical Perspective II (Intersentia, 2016); P Pleasence, V Kemp and NJ Balmer, ‘The 
justice lottery? Police station advice 25 years on from PACE [2011] Crim LR 3. 
 
18 Directive 2013/48/EU of 22 October 2013, L 294/1, Art 3.3(c). 
19 Art 7(5) of the Directive states that ‘the exercise by suspects and accused persons of the right to remain silent 
or of the right not to incriminate oneself shall not be used against them and shall not be considered to be 
evidence that they have committed the criminal offence concerned’. 
20 See, however, critiques of the power to draw adverse inferences, eg by Hannah Quirk, who has recently 
argued at the ‘Criminal Law Reform Now’ conference that ss 34-38 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994 should be repealed and the common law right of silence reinstated. See, in more detail, H Quirk, ‘The 
Right of Silence in England and Wales: Sacred Cow, Sacrificial Lamb or Trojan Horse?’ in J Jackson and S 
Summers, Obstacles to Fairness in Criminal Proceedings (Hart Publishing, forthcoming).  
21 See generally T Smith and Ed Cape, ‘The Rise and Decline of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales in A 
Flynn and J Hodgson (eds), Legal Aid and Access to Justice: Comparative Perspectives of Unmet Legal Need 
(Hart Publishing, forthcoming). 
affect the practice of other countries on suspects’ rights will be diminished.22  
This emerging isolationist trend has overtones of critiques of modern conceptions of the 
role of the UK in Europe, which went to the heart of the EU referendum debate, especially as 
regards the distorting effect of narrowly portraying the UK as solely being on the receiving 
end of EU pressures for reform rather than a modern nation central to the Union, capable to 
lead in Europe, positively affecting the attitudes of fellow EU Member States in its various 
interactions with them.23 
 
The way forward: a renewed emphasis on the ECHR? 
 
The imminent departure from the Charter of Fundamental Rights and relevant EU Directives 
represents a missed opportunity for enhancing the protection of suspects’ rights in the UK, 
sharing with European partners UK expertise on how to effectively implement them in 
practice and reinforcing ‘mutual trust’ as a basis for cross-European cooperation on criminal 
justice matters. But, on the other hand, both the Charter and EU legislation on fair trial 
standards are still in their infancy, and the UK has generally fared well under the sheer 
influence of the ECHR as regards the protection of suspects’ rights in the recent past. Placing 
a renewed emphasis on ECHR jurisprudence to fill in the gap might therefore go some way 
towards guaranteeing the protection of key procedural rights, even if does not provide the 
momentum for the accelerated and comprehensive reforms that one might otherwise be able 
to envisage under the EU Directives and even if it cannot secure enforcement through the 
more rigorous mechanisms that are available to EU law.24  
We should, in particular, note here that it was Strasbourg that breathed new life to the EU 
project on common fair trial rights, after this had come to a standstill as a result of resistance 
from a number of influential EU Member States,25 and that Strasbourg jurisprudence has 
                                                 
22 Cape notes that ‘until now the approach of England and Wales has been regarded as something of a model’, 
then suggests that, as a result of EU opt outs and backtracking on existing legal aid safeguards in the UK, this 
will no longer be the case. Ed Cape, ‘Criminal Defence: The Value and the Price’, Keynote speech to Law 
Society Criminal Law Conference, May 2013.  
23 See generally D Giannoulopoulos, ‘A Powerful Vision of Britain as a European Leader – Thank Gordon 
Brown for That’, The Conversation, 14 June 2016. 
24 Concern over the failure of many Member States to observe the ECHR fair trial requirements with 
satisfactory consistency was one the main reasons behind legislating the Roadmap Directives in the first place. 
See House of Lords, European Union Committee, Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings (2004-05) HL 
Paper 28, para 4. 
25 The European Commission’s 2004 proposal for a framework decision on certain procedural rights throughout 
the European Union had the ambition to move EU law in this direction, but it soon ‘became clear there was no 
collective political will to agree the provisions and the proposal was reduced to little more than a letter of intent 
which held no compulsion or compellability’. See European Criminal Bar Association, Procedural Safeguards. 
continued to evolve – at an impressive pace – long after the first Roadmap Directives came 
into effect, being the key driving force for the substantial reforms of suspects’ rights that we 
have in recent years witnessed in Europe. What is more, ECtHR jurisprudence on suspects’ 
rights is now starting to directly take into account the Roadmap Directives.26 This means that 
in subscribing to the Convention, the UK will at the same time be upholding guarantees that 
are part of the relevant EU Directives, in line with relevant interpretations adopted by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).  
It can be argued therefore that the ECHR can, to some extent, provide an adequate 
substitute for the loss of the Charter, at least in relation to fair trials protections. The ECHR 
may also prove an easier pill for Eurosceptics in Britain to swallow. To their satisfaction, 
resistance to Strasbourg from the UK political and judicial establishment has risen to such 
levels in recent years27 that they probably now consider the Convention an easy target, 
especially in comparison to the more interventionist role that the CJEU was posing (in their 
eyes), as a result of the far more rigorous enforcement mechanisms that the latter possesses in 
comparison with the ECtHR. 
 
The ECHR under attack  
 
Post Brexit Euroscepticism is, of course, anything but conducive to placing a renewed 
emphasis on the ECHR. The relationship of the UK with the ECtHR has become highly 
contentious in recent years, with Strasbourg decisions on prisoners’ rights, whole life tariffs, 
deportation of foreign suspected terrorists and the action of UK military forces abroad among 
other things generating fierce criticism from the tabloid press and even from the 
(Conservative-minded part of the) broadsheet press.28 In response to these concerns, and 
seeking to appease Conservative voters that might otherwise have been lured by UKIP’s 
strong anti-European rhetoric, the Conservative party published in October 2014 proposals 
                                                                                                                                                       
But Strasbourg jurisprudence, starting with Salduz v Turkey (2008) 49 EHRR 421, turned the tide in favour of 
wider EU integration in this area. 
26 In AT v Luxembourg Application No 30460/13, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 9 April 2015, at para 87, the 
ECtHR drew on the Directive on the right of access to a lawyer to conclude that the lawyer’s presence during 
questioning will not suffice for the right to fair trial to be respected, and that national legislation must also 
provide for private consultation with a lawyer prior to the beginning of the interrogation. In Zachar and Čierny 
v Slovakia Applications Nos 29376/12 and 29384/12, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 21 July 2015, the Court 
relied on Directive on the right to access to a lawyer and the Directive on the right to information to decide that 
a waiver of the right to custodial legal assistance had not been effective. 
27 See eg such as reflected in the cases of Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2) [2005] ECHR 681 and Al-Khawaja 
and Tahery v the United Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 1 respectively. 
28 See eg D Barrett, ‘Calls grow to boycott “toxic” human rights court’, The Telegraph, 9 July 2013. 
seeking to eradicate the effect of the Convention in the UK. The main ambition was to ensure 
that the ECtHR would ‘no longer [be] binding over the UK Supreme Court’ and would ‘no 
longer [be] able to order a change in UK law’, and that ‘a proper balance between rights and 
responsibilities in UK law’ would be restored.  
In November 2015, a blueprint for the UK Bill of Rights was leaked to the Sunday Times, 
and it went so far as to suggest that ‘under the new system, judges would not have to follow 
rulings of the ECtHR slavishly any longer, and that ‘instead, they [would] be able to rely on 
the common law or rulings by courts in other Commonwealth countries, such as Australia or 
Canada, when making their judgments’. These proposals revealed ‘grave misconceptions 
about the nature of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its relationship 
with comparative law, if not a cynical attempt to trivialize the effects of putting in place a UK 
human rights system à la carte’.29 It remains to be seen, when and if a consultation for a Bill 
of Rights is announced, whether the government is still subscribing to such a view of the 
Convention; concern has consistently been expressed that this is practically a plan for an 
ECHR-minus.30  
In the meantime, the UK continues to refuse to implement the judgment of the ECtHR in 
the case of Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2) on the issue of prisoners’ rights to vote, 
delivered in 2005, which risks ‘undermin[ing] the standing of the UK’ and would also ‘give 
succour to those states in the Council of Europe who have a poor record of protecting human 
rights and who could regard the UK’s action as setting a precedent for them to follow’.31 
Irrespective of how controversial the topic has proved to be, this is another illustration of the 
UK backtracking on its international human rights commitments instead of leading in Europe. 
In light of the above, it is perhaps more convincing to predict that leaving the EU Charter 
and EU law risks creating momentum for a simultaneous exit from the ECHR, rather than 
contemplate the opposite, more specifically that a newly discovered confidence in the ECHR 
would somehow counterbalance the loss of rights that would have been afforded with the EU 
Directives. Conor Gearty’s acute warning – in the preface of his disturbingly timely ‘On 
Fantasy Island’ project – captures this beautifully: ‘Now that the larger European 
entanglement has been successfully seen off, the time has come for finishing the unfinished 
                                                 
29 D Giannoulopoulos, ‘The Bill of Rights leak shows draft plans are plainly flawed’, Solicitors Journal, 24 
November 2015. 
30 See generally Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘A Bill of Rights for the UK?’, 29th report (2007-8) HL 
paper 165/II, HC paper 150-II. 
31 Joint Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill, First Report, Executive summary, 16 
December 2013. 
business of human rights destruction’, he notes,32 bringing the two main targets of British 
Euroscepticism – EU membership and the ECHR – alarmingly close to each other. Now if 
these worrying predictions are correct, then the UK is heading straight to ‘a potential human 
rights legal deficit’, where – without the legal protections afforded by both EU law and the 
ECtHR, and in the absence of a written constitution – access to rights and remedies could be 
taken away without proper checks or safeguards.33 
 
A written constitution and a UK Bill of Rights 
 
It was perhaps with the threat of such a legal deficit in mind that Dominic Grieve has recently 
suggested – at a recent ‘Britain in Europe’ event – that ‘Parliament should consider whether 
the time is right to draw up a formal written constitution for the United Kingdom’. The 
former Attorney General explained that ‘the government’s position had become more 
nuanced of late, with its proposals not only directed at the Strasbourg court but also against 
the “predatory activities of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg” ’. A written 
constitution, in combination with a Bill of Rights, ‘would allow the opportunity to define and 
protect rights constitutionally rather than via the ECHR’, so long as it were ‘compatible with 
our convention obligations’, he concluded. He emphasised, nonetheless, that the ECHR was 
‘the single most important instrument for promoting human rights on the planet’ and a 
potential withdrawal of the UK would be ‘very damaging for the promotion of human rights 
elsewhere’.34 
With a departure from EU human rights law now a foregone conclusion, and with the 
ECHR teetering on the brink of a long awaited, politically calculated, decision by Theresa 
May’s government on whether to push forward with the proposals for a UK Bill of Rights, 
the idea of a written constitution, combined with a national Bill of Rights, carries a lot of 
force. Whether there is any political willingness to move in this direction is another matter.  
On the other hand, we must pause to observe that, for all its worth, this solution would still 
place the UK in the second league of human rights protections in Europe. Written 
constitutions and Bill of Rights are a common phenomenon there, and they normally enjoy a 
harmonious existence with international human rights law (they are supposed to complement 
                                                 
32 C Gearty, On Fantasy Island – Britain, Europe and Human Rights (OUP, 2016). 
33 K Boyle, ‘The legitimacy of the EU referendum requires that citizens are informed of the implications of their 
decision’. Democratic Audit UK, 2 April 2016. 
34 See ‘Dominic Grieve QC: “It may be time to consider a written constitution” ’, Solicitors Journal, 4 March 
2016. The full lecture is available to watch from the BiE website: ‘Former Attorney General warns of 
ramifications from leaving the ECHR’, 21 March 2016.  
each other). But such is the state of the debate on the UK’s international human rights 
obligations at the moment that even an imperfect – ECHR-minus – system, based exclusively 
on national law, has a lot going for it. 
 
Concluding thought 
 
This contextual study of Brexit’s ramifications for fair trial rights demonstrates that the UK 
Government must abandon plans for a potential withdrawal from the ECHR. It must instead 
re-establish faith in the much maligned Convention, if we are to grapple with the looming 
threat of an unprecedented human rights legal deficit.  
